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Introduction
Liberal feminism is a significant strand of feminist jurisprudence (or feminist legal theory)
in the United States and elsewhere. The relationship between liberalism and feminism, however,
is complex. As an historical matter, there is little doubt that liberal political philosophy serves as
an important foundation for feminist political and legal thought. Feminists have divided, however,
between viewing liberalism and feminism as “incompatible,” and its doctrines as best relegated to
the past, and arguing that the better feminist response is to “reconfigure, rather than reject,
liberalism.” 1
Any assessment of liberal feminism as a strand of feminist legal theory starts with the
liberal and liberal feminist concepts of individual liberty, autonomy, dignity, and equality and
recognition of the injustice of gender-based restrictions based on men’s and women’s proper
spheres and roles. 2 A prominent example of the influence of these concepts and commitments is
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1
Amy R. Baehr, Introduction, in VARIETIES OF FEMINIST LIBERALISM 1 (Amy R. Baehr, ed. 2004) (arguing that the
incompatibility of liberalism and feminism has been “arguably the dominant view among feminist scholars over the
past thirty years”); RUTH ABBEY, THE RETURN OF FEMINIST LIBERALISM 2, 4 (2011) (“reconfigure”).We generally
use the term “liberal feminist political philosophy” to distinguish it from liberal feminist legal thought, but at times
simply use the term “liberal feminism” or “feminist liberalism” when the context makes our meaning clear.
2
See ALLISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 47-48, 173-84 (1988 ed.).
*

1
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the sex equality litigation of the 1970s undertaken by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU’s
Women’s Rights Project, which challenged the pervasive sex-based discrimination in law and
society’s basic institutions. 3 These gender-based challenges transformed the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
ushered in a more skeptical judicial review of gender-based classifications, known as intermediate
scrutiny.
Under intermediate scrutiny, legislatures may not rely on “fixed notions” about “the sexes”
and must offer an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for using sex-based classifications. 4 This
gender revolution continues to shape understandings of constitutional equality and the
interpretation of statutory civil rights laws, such as Title VII. 5 Within “liberal feminism,” there are
feminist legal scholars who, similar to Ginsburg, argue for symmetry or “formal equality” in law,
even when dealing with evident differences between women and men—such as pregnancy—
because of the risk of protectionism and a return of harmful gender ideology. 6
Another body of liberal feminist legal theory builds upon liberal legal and political theory
and liberal feminist political philosophy, ranging from John Stuart and Harriet Taylor Mill, in the
19th century, to John Rawls and Susan Moller Okin in the 20th century. These scholars have
explored the tension between liberal ideals and gender injustice in marriage and family law and
argued for governmental obligation to foster the preconditions for and address the obstacles to
meaningful personal and political self-government. 7 Such theorists have also advocated law

Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970's,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 11 (1989).
4
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
5
78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
6
Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 UNIV. CHI. L. FORUM 99 (1989).
7
See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY
(2006).
3
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reform to advance values such as dignity, self-expression, and sexual privacy, particularly as newer
technologies, such as the internet, bring both new possibilities and new forms of gendered injury. 8
This chapter begins with liberal feminism’s historical roots in liberal and feminist political
philosophy. It then considers the role of liberal feminism in law and legal thought and its
relationship to other strands of feminist legal theory. It addresses how liberal feminism responds
to internal feminist and external critiques and suggests the generative role of key liberal feminist
tenets in ongoing struggles over sex equality.
On one view, the contribution of liberal feminism is mostly of historical interest in light of
subsequent generations of feminist legal thought. On another, however, liberal feminism continues
to inform feminist legal thought and legal advocacy, although its present-day exemplars engage in
a more complex and nuanced discourse about sex, gender, and the gender binary than their
forebears did a half century ago. This chapter concludes that the latter view is the more persuasive
one. Liberal feminism can offer an inclusive and adaptive theory that provides insight in such
diverse contexts as articulating the meaning of liberty and determining the scope of discrimination
based on “sex,” including transgender rights. Because liberal feminism aims at “disrupting—or
bursting asunder” historical and rigid links between “biological sex and particular roles or ways of
thinking associated with particular genders,” liberal feminism has the potential to adapt as ideas
about sex, gender, and identity continue to evolve. 9
Defining Liberal Feminism

See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999); Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870 (2019).
9
Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement Comparatively Recast, 31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 277, 315 (2008).
8
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A commonplace criticism of liberalism is the slipperiness of the concept and the difficulty
of defining it. The broad “family of positions” described as “liberalism” include positions
“profoundly different” from each other, such as Kantian or Rawlsian liberalism, on the one hand,
and, on the other, classical utilitarianism liberalism and present-day neoliberalism. 10 For this
reason, feminist defenders of liberalism have argued that feminist critics often attack a caricatured
or oversimplified picture of liberalism. 11 What, then, is “liberal” in liberal feminism and what
makes it “feminist”? Answering these questions begins with visiting the roots of liberal feminism
and tracking its emergence as a distinct strand of feminist legal thought through to its current
relevance.
Historical roots: Nineteenth century liberal feminists
Liberal legal feminism has roots in both liberal and feminist political theory. “Modern
Western feminism,” Ruth Abbey asserts, “grew up as a sister doctrine to liberalism.” 12 Classic
liberal political theory, such as that of John Locke, challenged patriarchal authority with respect
to political power. Pioneering “feminist liberals,” including Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor,
and John Stuart Mill, extended Locke’s critique to private power. Such early feminists, including
American feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, applied “liberal
commitments to women” as a “matter of justice.” 13 Those “liberal commitments” include such
values as:
individual freedom; equality before the law; equal opportunity; moral equality;
personal autonomy; being rewarded (or punished) on the basis of merit rather than
birth; the rejection of arbitrary and unearned power and hierarchy and its
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 57 (1999).
Linda C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1171 (1992); NUSSBAUM, supra note 10, at 57.
12
ABBEY, supra note 1, at 1.
13
Id.; see also DEBORAH RHODE, GENDER AND JUSTICE 12 (1989) (liberalism was the “most dominant influence” on
“American feminism”).
10
11
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replacement with the idea that the exercise of power by one individual over another
must be rationally defended; consent to rule by those ruled; and freedom of
conscience. 14
Such liberal ideals are evident in Abigail Adams’s famous plea to her husband John Adams,
in 1776, to “Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your
ancestors,” as he and other male politicians constructed a “new Code of Laws.” Abigail Adams
urged: “Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands. Remember that all men
would be tyrants if they could.” 15 John Adams responded that he “cannot but laugh” at her
“extraordinary Code of Laws” and “saucy” letter. But the answer, in any case, was no: “Depend
upon it. We know better than to repeal our Masculine systems.” 16 John Adams asserted that men
held such power more in theory than practice, and would “dare not exert” it in “its full Latitude;”
nonetheless, to yield their power would subject men to “the Despotism of the Petticoat.” 17
Rather than abolishing coverture marriage (the gender hierarchical common law model of
marriage that travelled from England to the colonies), the revolutionary-era political leaders
enlisted marriage as an emblem or “analogue to the legitimate polity.” 18 They drew on Locke’s
idea that political legitimacy rested on individual consent to be governed; marriage, they reasoned,
was a social contract to which women freely consented. 19
In the nineteenth century, women’s rights advocates continued to challenge coverture and
called for full civil and political rights. They employed liberal political ideals of individual self-

ABBEY, supra note 1, at 1.
Abigail and John Adams Converse on Women’s Rights, 1776, THE AMERICAN YAWP READER,
https://www.americanyawp.com/reader/the-american-revolution/abigail-and-john-adams-converse-on-womensrights1776/#:~:text=The%20American%20Revolution%20invited%20a,the%20limits%20of%20revolutionary%20liberty.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 16 (1999).
19
Id. at 14.
14
15
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determination and being “free . . . from the constraints of an ascribed status and separate sphere”
to shape feminist demands. 20
Many activists in the movement for women’s rights began as “ardent abolitionists” and
their experience in the antislavery movement—including gender discrimination within the
movement—led them to draw parallels between abolition and women’s rights. 21 Such women’s
rights reformers “contended that both institutions, slavery and marriage, harbored inequalities
inconsistent with American principles of liberty and equality.” 22 The reformers applied Locke’s
theory that each person had a property in his own person to argue that because both the slave and
the wife under coverture lacked such self-possession, they were denied the natural right to selfownership. 23 Abolitionist sisters Angelina and Sarah Grimké, for example, pointed out parallels
between the master/slave and husband/wife relationship, but disclaimed an exact comparison
between “free women” and enslaved persons, given enslaved women’s greater “suffering,”
“degradation” and denial of any legal status. 24
Defenders of slavery, in turn, appealed to the parallels between slavery and marriage to
justify both systems of white men’s “mastership over their households.” 25 In the pre-Civil War
constitutional order, states’ primary responsibility to regulate their “domestic institutions” referred
“simultaneously to family and to slavery.” 26

RHODE, supra note 13, at 12.
See SALLY G. MCMILLEN, SENECA FALLS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 35-70 (2008);
RHODE, supra note 13, at 12.
22
COTT, supra note 18, at 63.
23
Id. at 64.
24
Id. at 60-66; see also LISA PACE VETTER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING FEMINISTS 128,
132, 139-41 (2017) (explicating Sarah Grimke’s “Quaker liberalism”).
25
COTT, supra note 18, at 63.
26
MARK E. BRANDON, STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 83
(2013).
20
21
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The campaign for women’s suffrage enlisted liberal principles to attack both the unjust
structure of family governance and the exclusion of women from the franchise as inconsistent with
democratic and constitutional ideals. 27 Illustrative is the Declaration of Rights and Sentiments,
which emanated from the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848. It invoked the “liberal premises” of
the Declaration of Independence: “created equal,” women had “certain inalienable rights,” which
were “usurped” by “man” claiming the “right to “assign” women a “sphere of action,” when that
right belonged to “her conscience and her God.” 28 To arguments that gender hierarchy and the
separate roles of men and women derived from “nature” and the “Creator,” feminists responded
with their own appeals to divine order.
The Declaration of Sentiments foreshadowed 20th century liberal feminism by stressing
the equal capabilities of women and men as a basis for equal rights and by condemning the legal
disabilities imposed on women. 29 While radical for its time in some respects, the Declaration also
“reflected its time;” some of its arguments for women’s rights “elevated white women above male
immigrants, free black men and women, and the destitute who lacked the advantages many middleclass women possessed.” 30

See Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, YALE L. J. FORUM 450
(Jan. 21, 2020).
28
Declaration of Right and Sentiments, reproduced as Appendix A in MCMILLEN, supra note 21, at 237-38; RHODE,
supra note 13, at 12.
29
Declaration of Right and Sentiments, supra note 28, at 237-41.
30
MCMILLEN, supra note 21, at 91 (quoting the Declaration’s argument “that men withheld rights from women but
gave the same rights ‘to the most ignorant and degraded men – both natives and foreigners’”). Susan B. Anthony’s
angry, racist criticisms of the Fifteenth Amendment’s extending the franchise only to African American men drew on
“ethnic and racial stereotypes and negative views about immigrants [and women] that were common currency in late
nineteenth- century America.” Virginia Sapiro, The Power and Fragility of Social Movement Coalitions: The Woman
Suffrage Movement to 1870, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1557, 1604-06 (2020) (giving example of Frederick Douglass’s
criticism of opponents of Black male suffrage as “drunken Irishmen and ignorant Dutchmen”).
27

7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3854104

The appeal to women’s equal capacities also featured in arguments that separate spheres
ideology denied women the right to choose their own “proper sphere.” 31 Such critiques of sex
inequality invoked the influential work of John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill. 32 In The
Subjection of Women (1869), John Stuart Mill wrote that “the legal subordination of one sex to the
other” as an organizing principle was “wrong” and should be replaced by “a principle of perfect
equality, admitting no power of privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.” 33
Mill’s On Liberty (1859) supported liberal feminist arguments about the value of personal
and political self-government and anti-paternalism. Further, in explaining misunderstandings of
liberty, Mill criticized the “almost despotic power of husbands over wives,” arguing that “wives
should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in the same manner, as all
other persons.” 34
While liberalism was a dominant influence on 19th century feminism, another prominent
strand of feminism used “the rhetoric of natural roles” to argue for including women in public
life. 35 This appeal to gender differences stressed that “women’s special attributes” as mothers and
housekeepers would improve public life. 36 After ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, these
tensions over how best to secure women’s full civil, political, and social rights recurred in
disagreements over the Equal Rights Amendment, first written in 1923, and over sex-specific
protective labor legislation. 37 At issue was the question of whether formal equality (or gender

WENDELL PHILLIPS, SPEECHES, LECTURES, AND LETTERS (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1884) (“Woman’s Rights,”
speech made at Convention held in Worcester, Massachusetts, on October 15th and 16th, 1851).
32
Id. at 12 (praising John Stuart Mill).
33
John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869), in JOHN STUART MILL & HARRIET TAYLOR MILL, ESSAYS ON
SEX EQUALITY (Alice S. Rossi, ed. 1970).
34
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 97 (1859) (David Spitz, ed., 1975).
35
RHODE, supra note 13, at 14.
36
Id. at 14. On Jane Addams’s idea of civic, or municipal, housekeeping, see JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JANE
ADDAMS AND THE DREAM OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 161-68 (2002).
37
RHODE, supra note 13, at 34-50. See Julie C. Suk, The Equal Rights Amendment, Then and Now, this volume.
31

8
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neutral laws) as a constitutional mandate was a better path to “true” equality than an approach that
considered the “actual biological, social, and occupational differences between men and
women.” 38
Feminists engage twentieth century liberalism
In the 20th century, the liberal political philosopher John Rawls re-invigorated liberal
thought for many political and legal theorists, including liberal feminists. A Theory of Justice
(1971) and Political Liberalism (1993) offered, respectively, an argument about “justice as
fairness” that distilled key liberal social contract traditions and a conception of a “political”
liberalism that could support a “stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided
by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.” 39 Rawls posited that free and equal
citizens have two moral powers relating to self-government: (1) the capacity for a conception of
justice, which allows democratic self-government (or “deliberative democracy”); and (2) the
capacity to form, act on, and revise a conception of a good life, which allows personal selfgovernment (or “deliberative autonomy”). 40
Feminist political philosophers and legal theorists took up and critiqued Rawls’s work. 41
In Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989), liberal feminist Susan Moller Okin highlighted the
inattention to gender and family in prominent theories of justice. 42 Rawls, she observed, assumed
that, as a basic institution in a well-ordered society, families were just and could form children into

RHODE, supra note 13, at 36-37.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxv (1993). Rawls distinguished this “political liberalism” from a
“comprehensive liberalism” that would rest on or seek agreement on such doctrines.
40
Id. at 19; MCCLAIN, supra note 7, at 17 (citing JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1
(2006)).
41
See generally Baehr, supra note 1; ABBEY, supra note 1; Amy Baehr, Liberal Feminism, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 30, 2013) (online).
42
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).
38
39

9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3854104

self-governing members of such a society. Contradicting that assumption, however, were forms of
injustice within “gendered marriage,” such as domination and family violence, an unequal division
of labor between husbands/fathers and wives/mothers during marriage, and divorce law that failed
to recognize that inequality. 43 But Okin also argued that aspects of Rawls’s theory—such as his
construct of the “original position” in which people (behind a “veil of ignorance”) determine what
is a just outcome without knowing their social position in the society, including their sex—could
be a powerful tool for feminist criticism of contemporary institutions. 44 Okin proposed that
government could promote—but not compel—egalitarian marriage and adopt family law reforms
so that marriage no longer contributed to women’s “socially created vulnerability.” 45 Responding
to Okin and other feminist critique, Rawls clarified that, on his account, the family was not a space
exempt from justice, but instead “the equal rights of women and the basic rights of children as
future citizens are inalienable and protect them wherever they are.” 46
Gender injustice within the family was also a central concern of philosopher and law
professor Martha Nussbaum’s “human capabilities approach” to human development, which she
characterized as reflecting both a form of political liberalism (akin to Rawls’s) and a universalist
feminism. 47 Nussbaum attempted to address feminist critiques of liberalism for inattention to the
moral virtues linked to care as well as the practical reality that the family has been a “major site of
the oppression of women.” 48 To value care, her approach accorded the capabilities for love and
care a prominent place in a political conception of justice and made them “important goals of social

Id. at 93-97.
Id. at 101.
45
Id. at 168-86.
46
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 765, 791 (1997).
47
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 4-8 (2000).
48
Id. at 242-43.
43
44
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planning.” 49 To guard against risks that women will not be treated as ends in themselves but as
instrumental beings (for example, as “reproducers and care givers”), she insisted that, within the
family, the focus should be on “each person,” akin to the liberal tradition’s focus “on the individual
as the basic political subject.” 50
Liberal Legal Feminism in the Second Wave
The political roots of 20th century liberal feminism are often situated in the organized
women’s movement (the “Second Wave”) that focused on “achieving equality through litigation
and legislative reform.” 51 In 1966, Betty Friedan (author of The Feminine Mystique) and civil
rights activist and feminist lawyer Pauli Murray were instrumental in forming the National
Organization for Women (NOW), born out of frustration over the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s failure to enforce Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based employment
discrimination. NOW’s purpose (famously scribbled by Friedan on a napkin) was “to take action
to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of American society now, assuming all
the privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partnership with men.” 52 That equal
partnership reached beyond the “public world” to include the conventionally “private” realm of
marriage, entailing “an equitable sharing of the responsibilities of the home and children and of
the economic burdens of their support.” 53 NOW’s purposes were liberal feminist in arguing that
because sexism and gender stereotypes harmed women and men, both had a stake in restructuring

Id. at 245.
Id. at 245-46.
51
RHODE, supra note 13, at 59; see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803,
829 (1990); JAGGAR, supra note 2, at 188-89 (describing NOW’s liberal feminist focus on “equality of opportunity”
and rational capacity).
52
Founding: Setting the Stage, NOW, https://now.org/about/history/founding-2/ (visited July 4, 2020); PAULI
MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT: MEMOIR OF AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE 468-80 (1987; 2018 ed.).
53
JANE MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 99 (1986) (quoting NOW’s 1966 founding statement of purpose).
49
50
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work, family, and other basic social institutions and in ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment. 54
Ruth Bader Ginsburg Helms the Women’s Rights Project
A similar premise about the harms of gender inequality and sexism informed Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s constitutional litigation conducted with the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project (WRP)
while she was a professor at Rutgers. 55 Frequently described as a leading example of “early liberal
feminist theorists in America,” 56 Ginsburg does not seem to have used the label “liberal feminist”
to describe herself. However, she drew on the liberal philosophy discussed above to dismantle
legally-enforced sex inequality. For example, in speaking of “the unfinished business of equality
for women,” Ginsburg quoted Mill’s argument that “the legal subordination of one sex to the other”
should be replaced by “a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power of privilege on the one
side, nor disability on the other.” 57
Ginsburg’s approach to equality is “liberal” because it insisted that people should not be
disadvantaged based on membership in a group and instead should be evaluated based on their
individual capacity. As Ginsburg explained the “fundamental premise” of the 1970s cases she
litigated: “the law’s differential treatment of men and women, typically rationalized as reflecting
‘natural’ differences between the sexes, historically had tended to contribute to women’s
subordination—their confined ‘place’ in man’s world—even when conceived as protective of the
fairer, but weaker and dependent-prone sex.” 58 Ginsburg’s strategy exemplified liberal feminism
in identifying how sex role stereotypes and “fixed notions” about the sexes rationalized women’s
RHODE, supra note 13, at 59-60.
Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 3, at 11. Ginsburg co-founded the WRP with attorney Brenda Feigen.
56
Dixon, supra note 9, at 298; Cain, supra note 51, at 829 (associating liberal feminism in legal academy with
Ginsburg, Herma Hill Kay, Wendy Williams and Nadine Taub).
57
See RUTH BADER GINSBURG (WITH MARY HARTNETT AND WENDY W. WILLIAMS), MY OWN WORDS 119 (quoting
Mill in epigraph to Ginsburg’s Women and the Law: A Symposium Introduction, 25 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1
(1971)).
58
Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 3, at 11.
54
55
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legal subordination. Ginsburg’s sought to help the Supreme Court perceive this inequity and move
it toward a “constitutional principle that would provide for heightened, thoughtful review of gender
classifications.” 59 The challenge was formidable. To use Ginsburg’s memorable image about
constitutional interpretation at the time the WRP began: “Except for the vote [the Nineteenth
Amendment], the Constitution remained an empty cupboard for people seeking to promote the
equal stature of women and men as individuals under the law.” 60
The full story of Ginsburg’s successful constitutional litigation challenging gender
discrimination is amply told elsewhere. 61 This chapter briefly reviews a few cases in that
campaign to highlight what they reveal about the contours of liberal feminism. 62 The tale
usually begins with Reed v. Reed (1971), in which Ginsburg co-authored the plaintiff’s
brief, and, for the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a law using a gender-based
classification violated the Equal Protection Clause. 63 An important prequel that shaped the
winning argument in Reed, however, was Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
which Ginsburg successfully argued with her husband, tax lawyer Marty Ginsburg, before
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 64 Moritz illustrates a striking feature of Ginsburg’s

Id.
Id. at 13.
61
See id.; IRIN CARMON AND SHANA KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG 51 (2015); RBG (CNN Films 2018); ON THE
BASIS OF SEX (Focus Features 2018); Linda Greenhouse, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court’s Feminist Icon, Is
Dead at 87, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020).
62
Ginsburg authored the briefs for Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), Struck v. Secretary of Defense, cert. granted,
409 U.S. 947, judgment vacated, 409 U.S 1071 (1972), Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44
(1975). She authored the brief and presented oral argument for Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1947), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772
(1975), Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). She also wrote
amicus briefs for numerous other cases in this time period. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Progression of Women in the
Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1161 (1994).
63
Reed, 404 U.S. 71.
64
Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972). In April 1971, Ginsburg sent the brief
she and Martin Ginsburg wrote in Moritz to Mel Wulf, at the ACLU, who was then working on Sally Reed’s appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court, commenting: “Some of this should be useful for Reed v. Reed.” Wulf solicited her help
on Reed. CARMON & KNIZHNIK, supra note 61, at 52.
59
60
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litigation strategy: bringing claims by male plaintiffs to show how a sex-based
classification violated the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiff in that case, Charles E.
Moritz, lived with his eighty-nine-year old mother and paid someone to care for her when
he could not. The IRS denied him a dependent care deduction because he was a nevermarried man; he would have received the deduction had he been a daughter, widower, or a
husband to a woman in need of care. This strange scheme suggested that “the idea that a
man on his own might be responsible somehow for caregiving apparently never crossed
the government’s mind.” 65 The Tenth Circuit unanimously held that the IRS rule violated
principles of equal protection because the classification, “premised primarily on sex,”
lacked any justification: Congress could have achieved its evident purpose of giving relief
to persons “in low income brackets and bearing special burdens of dependents” without
resorting to “invidious discrimination based solely on sex.” 66
Fortunately, when Solicitor General Erwin Griswold urged the U.S. Supreme Court
to overrule the Tenth Circuit, he unwittingly provided Ginsburg a roadmap for attacking
discriminatory laws. Included in his filing was a computer-generated list of hundreds of
federal “laws and regulations that treated men and women differently, and, thus, were at
risk of being found unconstitutional if the Court did not reverse. 67
In Reed v. Reed, the first of Ginsburg and the WRP’s cases brought before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the gender-based law at issue was an Idaho statute giving preference to men as
administrators of estates when more than one qualified person was available. Sally Reed sought
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to administer her deceased son’s estate, but, under that statutory preference, the child’s father (an
abusive husband from whom she was separated) received the appointment. 68 Ginsburg’s brief
argued that “the sex line drawn by [Idaho’s law], mandating subordination of women to men
without regard to individual capacity, created a ‘suspect classification’ requiring close judicial
scrutiny.” 69 The brief drew analogies to race, already a suspect classification, arguing that, in
both instances, an “unalterable trait of birth” should not be the basis for legislative
discrimination. 70
Liberal feminist emphases on the individual, on biology not determining a woman or
man’s societal roles, and on removing gender-based obstacles to full participation in society were
evident in Ginsburg’s brief:
Laws which disable women from full participation in the political, business and
economic arenas are often characterized are “protective” and beneficial. Those
same laws applied to racial or ethnic minorities would readily be recognized as
invidious and impermissible. The pedestal upon which women have been placed
has all too often, upon close inspection, been revealed as a cage. 71
In comparing race and gender discrimination, Ginsburg drew on the insights of Pauli
Murray, who, as a Black woman, experienced both race and sex discrimination and theorized
their connection. 72 In Jane Crow and the Law, Murray had argued: “That manifestations of racial
prejudice have been more brutal than the more subtle manifestations of prejudice by reason of
sex in no way diminishes the force of the equally obvious fact that the rights of women and the
rights of Negroes are only different phases of the fundamental and indivisible issues of human
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rights.” 73 To acknowledge that Ginsburg stood “on [the] shoulders” of Murray and Dorothy
Kenyon (with whom Murray had successfully litigated civil rights cases that “put their theories
of the parallels and intersections of race and gender into practice”), Ginsburg listed their names
on the Reed brief. 74
The Burger Court unanimously held the Idaho statute was unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it treated similarly situated
applicants differently. The Court, however, did not embrace the heightened standard of review
that Ginsburg sought; instead, it claimed merely to be applying a rational basis standard. 75
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson, argued by Ginsburg for amicus ACLU, the
Court came within one vote of adopting strict scrutiny for classifications based on sex when it
struck down a federal statute that automatically gave men in the military an allowance for health
care and housing for their wives, but allowed women that allowance only if they proved their
spouse was financially dependent on them. 76 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion recognized the
close relationship between sex-role stereotypes and discrimination diagnosed by liberal
feminism. He also invoked the pedestal/cage imagery first used in Ginsburg’s Reed brief to
declare that, “traditionally,” sex discrimination “was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic
paternalism,’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” 77 Referring
to “our Nation[‘s] . . . long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,” Brennan observed
how notions about women’s proper place led to “our statute books gradually [becoming] laden
with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes,” drawing parallels between such laws and
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“pre-Civil War slave codes.” 78 Applying suspect classification criteria, his opinion characterized
sex, like race, as immutable and determined by an “accident of birth.” Declaring that “the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,” Brennan
concluded that individuals must be judged on their capacity, not group membership. 79 While
powerful, Brennan’s race/sex comparisons came to illustrate the problem of treating “woman”
and “black” as mutually exclusive categories, thus omitting Black women. 80
In 1976, the Court finally settled on a new test for sex-based classifications:
“intermediate scrutiny.” Ginsburg briefed and argued Craig v. Boren, in which Justice
Brennan—this time writing for a majority—interpreted Reed and other cases to establish that
“classifications by gender must serve important governmental objections and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” 81 Under that test, as the Court
subsequently elaborated, government must offer an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for
such classifications. 82
Ginsburg would bring and win more Equal Protection cases challenging gender-based
classifications, often featuring male plaintiffs. 83 As Irin Carmon and Shana Knizhnik summed it
up: Ginsburg “firmly believed that for women to be equal, men had to be free.” 84 On this liberal,
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egalitarian view, equal treatment of men and women in law was the best path to freedom and
equality.
Justice Ginsburg on the Supreme Court
After she was elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993, Justice Ginsburg had the
extraordinary opportunity to explain the gender revolution in the Court’s Equal Protection
jurisprudence that she helped to launch. In 1996, in United States v. Virginia (“VMI”), Ginsburg
declared that “[s]ince Reed, the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state
government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or official policy
denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to
aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and
capacities.” 85 Her majority opinion’s emphasis on individual capacity, equal opportunity, and
anti-stereotyping marked her approach as liberal feminist. Ginsburg explained that sex-based
classifications “may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women,” but may be used “to compensate women ‘for particular
economic disabilities [they have] suffered, to ‘promot[e] equal employment opportunity,’ [and]
to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our nation’s people.” 86
The Court struck down VMI’s male-only admissions policy and concluded that its
proposed remedy of offering young women a chance to attend the newly-created Virginia
Women’s Institute of Leadership (VWIL) did not cure the constitutional violation. Ginsburg
concluded that Virginia offered no “exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding all
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women” from VMI’s “citizen-soldier training,” 87 insisting that “generalizations about ‘the way
women are,’[and] estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying
opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description.” 88
Noting the long history of excluding women from central societal institutions based on
assumptions about their capacities, Ginsburg wrote: “State actors controlling gates to
opportunity, we have instructed, may not exclude qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.’” 89 Accordingly, for those women who
“want a VMI education and can make the grade,” VWIL was not a sufficient constitutional
remedy. 90
Two decades later, in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, Justice Ginsburg drew on VMI’s antistereotyping premises to hold unconstitutional a gender-based difference in a 1940 citizenship
law that favored “unwed U.S.-citizen mothers” over “unwed U.S.-citizen fathers,” based on
“stunningly anachronistic” gender role assumptions that only unwed mothers will care for their
children. 91 Ginsburg’s opinion stressed the dynamic nature of constitutional interpretation: “‘new
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality . . . that once passed
unnoticed and unchallenged.’” 92 This case illustrates Ginsburg’s liberal feminist conviction that
women and men benefited from freedom from “fixed notions” about gender roles continued
throughout her judicial career.
Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) also suggests the capacity of liberal feminism’s
commitment to anti-stereotyping to extend to newer understandings of gender. At issue in
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Bostock was whether an adverse employment action based on an employee’s gender identity or
sexual orientation was discrimination on the basis of “sex” under Title VII. 93 The employer who
fired Aimee Stevens, a transgender woman, stated, in misgendering language, that he did so
because “he” wanted to “represent himself” and “dress like a woman.” 94 In finding for Stevens,
the Sixth Circuit reasoned: “a person is defined as transgender precisely because of the
perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes.” 95 At oral argument before
the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg observed that “the [precedential] cases have said that the
object of Title VII was to get at the entire spectrum of sex stereotypes.” 96 While conservative
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, did not elaborate a robust gender stereotyping theory,
he readily perceived the problem as sex discrimination: “it is impossible to discriminate against a
person for being [gay] or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on
sex.” 97 The Court’s ready perception that gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination
are sex discrimination testifies to the success of the liberal feminist project of shaking loose fixed
notions about “the sexes.”
The limits of formal equality through courts
Even as Ginsburg’s constitutional litigation campaign enjoyed success in the courts,
liberal legal feminists debated the limits of formal equality and the respective capacities of courts
versus legislatures to further substantive equality. One prominent example was the
sameness/difference—or equal treatment/special treatment—debate over how to accommodate
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pregnancy in the workplace. 98 Accounts of this debate use the term “liberal” or “liberal feminist”
to characterize the equal treatment or formal equality position taken by such scholars as Wendy
Webster Williams or Nadine Taub who, similar to Ginsburg, warned of the risks of judicial
protectionism and of reinforcing, rather than challenging, gender stereotypes. 99 Williams related
this formal equality approach and its skepticism about “gender-based” or “formally asymmetrical
laws”—even if designed to benefit women—to her generation coming of age when gender-based
laws “sort[ed] the world by gender in ways that defined us into the single role of
wife/mother/dependent and which overtly and explicitly privileged men in the public and private
spheres.” 100
In the face of critiques by “special treatment “ and other feminists that formal equality
required women to assimilate into a “pre-existing, predominantly male world” and left
untouched a legal status quo that expressed “white male middle-class interests and values,”
liberal feminists made an institutional argument. 101 Formal equality as a constitutional principle,
Williams argued, was what courts were best equipped to deliver; it was “a necessary, although
not sufficient, condition for substantive equality of the sexes.” 102 As did Ginsburg, Williams
believed that legislatures were the best place for feminists to pursue substantive equality in
pregnancy, work/family issues and a wide range of areas. 103
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Defending and reconstructing liberalism
Justice Ginsburg and “symmetrists” like Williams did not explicitly describe themselves
as liberal feminists. Other feminist legal theorists expressly have done so, locating their theories
and law reform proposals as growing out of critical conversation with, and feminist reconstruction
of, liberal commitments and principles. Although liberalism “became a suspect doctrine” for many
feminist theorists “in the second half of the 20th century,” liberal feminist political theorists
continued to engage in constructive critique of liberal political theory. 104 Rather than discard
liberalism, they argued that the problem was the failure to extend and realize key liberal principles
in the context of modern gender equality.
Reconstructing the value of autonomy and privacy
Contemporary liberal legal feminists have developed robust conceptions of autonomy,
liberty, and privacy, and theorized foundations for reproductive rights. They have emphasized
governmental obligations to promote gender equality and to address inequality in the family. For
example, one of the authors (McClain) has drawn on Rawls and Okin to argue that gender
equality, including within and among families, is a public value that government should promote.
She has argued that a feminist reading of Rawls supports recognizing care as a public value that
is part of a formative project of fostering capacity for democratic and personal selfgovernment. 105 On the other hand, some liberal feminist legal scholars, such as Maxine Eichner,
find Rawlsian liberalism inadequate to ground a robust argument for government’s responsibility
to support families. 106 Notably, both McClain and Eichner enlist liberal principles, but also argue
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for an expanded list of liberal goods to “facilitate caretaking and human development.” 107 Such
liberal feminists disagree with perfectionist feminist theorists who argue that liberalism’s
commitment to “neutrality,” toleration, and a conception of negative rights prevents government
from taking measures necessary to further women’s meaningful liberty and substantive
equality. 108
In the face of feminist skepticism about privacy, liberal legal feminists have also
articulated how privacy, rightly understood, is necessary to protect women’s autonomy, selfdetermination, and individual personhood. 109 In her pioneering book, Uneasy Access (1988),
philosopher and legal scholar Anita Allen acknowledged that privacy, in many instances,
historically isolated and oppressed women, but made a normative argument that women need
forms of privacy that foster women’s capacities and ability to “participate as equals.” 110 While
privacy once meant “confinement of women in the private household as subservient caretakers,”
Allen and other liberal feminists deployed the value of privacy to empower women’s “decisional
privacy,” and in turn enable “legal autonomy concerning sexuality, marriage, and the family.” 111
Thus, Allen argued, “privacy and private choice have survived appropriately strenuous feminist
critique, re-emerging in beneficially reconstructed forms.” 112 Through bodily and decisional
privacy, privacy becomes a means for gender equality. 113
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Liberal feminists have articulated the importance of sexual privacy in the wake of new
forms of technology, such as the internet and social media. Danielle Citron builds on Allen and
McClain’s work to advance a conception of sexual privacy as “egalitarian, liberal feminist.” 114
Citron defines sexual privacy as the ability to “manage the boundaries around our bodies and
intimate activities” and control information about the human body, sex, sexuality, gender and
intimate activities. 115 The values of sexual privacy include securing autonomy, enabling
intimacy, and protecting equality. 116 Citron explains that, on the one hand, the internet can foster
these values, including for women, LGBTQ persons, and people of color; on the other, because
these groups disproportionately experience privacy violations on the internet, the internet can
hinder their agency and autonomy. 117 Citron proposes remedies for the gendered and
intersectional harms caused by “revenge porn,” “deep fakes,” and other online abuses. 118
Liberal feminist have also theorized how decisional privacy in the sense of autonomy is
critical to reproductive choice and reproductive justice. The pivotal case of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey stated that: “the ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." 119 Liberal
feminists have related reproductive autonomy to an individual's personhood, liberty of
conscience, self-determination, and individual identity. 120 They have elaborated a conception of
privacy that is liberal in its aspiration for informed, morally autonomous choice, and egalitarian
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and feminist in its insistence that educational, economic, and sexual equality are a requirement
for meaningful choice. 121
Responses to dominance and relational feminism
These liberal feminist theorists have sought to address two distinct critiques from other
legal feminists. Through reconstructing conceptions of privacy, they respond to dominance
feminists arguments that “the private” is a site of inequality for women, such that, in the words of
Catharine MacKinnon, “the right of privacy is a right for men ‘to be let alone’ to oppress women
one at a time.” 122 They also counter dominance feminists’ contention that autonomy is an illusion
for women under conditions of subordination. Similar to MacKinnon, liberal feminists recognize
how private power distorts the development of autonomy, but they argue that government has a
responsibility to secure the preconditions for developing human capacity or human capabilities. 123
For liberal feminists, government must play an affirmative role in addressing forms of private
power that hinder this development of autonomy.
Liberal feminists also engage relational, or difference, feminists’ arguments that construe
autonomy as atomistic and contend that liberal models of the self and of self-government fail to
recognize care, interdependency, and connection. 124 Liberal feminists respond that when they
emphasize liberty, the value of individual autonomy, or self-government and self-determination,
they do not mean atomism or an unrealistic self-sufficiency. They offer notions of autonomy that
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mirror feminist models of “relational autonomy” in recognizing that “it is by virtue of a person’s
participation in relationships of nurture and care, initially within families and eventually in other
forms of association, that he or she is able to develop the capacity for autonomy.” 125 Thus,
relationships in families and other parts of civil society—as well as the broader social structure—
play a formative role in shaping a person’s identity and cultivating and enabling the self.
Responses to anti-essentialist and intersectional critiques
By the late 1980s, feminist legal theory, including liberal feminism, faced internal
criticism for a lack of inclusivity. The “essentialism” critique, prominently associated with
Angela Harris, centered on feminism’s assumed claim “that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s
experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation and
other realities of experience.” She contended that such accounts of women’s experiences ignored
the experiences of Black women and many others, silencing the voices of minority women in an
effort to craft a unified message of what “feminism” is. 126
Similarly, Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectionality critique faulted feminist discourse for
leaving out the experiences of Black women, emphasizing that individuals may face
discrimination or disempowerment on multiple fronts, such as race age, class, sexual orientation
or gender identity. She argued that the intersection of various harms based on these identities can
create unique and serious disadvantages. Like Harris, Crenshaw critiqued feminism that
“purports to speak for women of color through its invocation of the term ‘woman,’” while
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excluding “women of color because it is based on the experiences and interests of a certain
subset of women.” 127
Liberal feminism is compatible with, and strengthened by, these critiques, given its
attentiveness to individual capacity and the rejection of stereotypes. Notably, such critiques have
largely targeted dominance and relational feminism rather than liberal feminist theory. 128 Liberal
feminism is flexible enough to admit and accept the essentialism critique and to develop
intersectionally to support an inclusive and antiracist conception of gender equality. Decades
ago, Anne Dailey predicted that, informed by such critiques, a “renewed feminist liberalism”
could utilize the power of narratives to destabilize “prevailing legal discourse” and develop a
richer understanding of diversity based on empathetic listening. 129 This prediction remains apt:
liberal feminism embraces the individuality of each person and their choices and stands stronger
as it evolves to include women and men of all races, ethnicities and gender identities in their full
diversity.
Conclusion
Liberal feminism’s project aims at “disrupting – or bursting asunder – the historical
linkage between sex and gender, or between biological sex and particular roles or ways of
thinking associated with particular genders.” 130 This theme of disruption offers a point of
continuity with newer forms of feminism, even as those newer forms address a “much broader
range of linkages and identity categories.” 131 Further, evolving understandings of gender can
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extend that promise beyond the gender binary itself, deepening the capacity of liberal feminism
to adapt to new demands for liberty, inclusion, and equality.
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